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This paper investigates the development of local public finance in Germany, Switzerland, 
Poland and the United Kingdom. In this context important characteristics of municipal 
expenditures and revenues are examined in these countries. Differences in government 
structure (i.e. unitary or federal) do not appear to have a crucial role for municipal finance. 
The ways to protect local fiscal autonomy are discussed in the framework of the vertical fiscal 
equalisation system. In particular the application of the principle of parallel fiscal 
development between a state and its municipalities is examined. 
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In several European countries a large number of municipalities suffer from fiscal stress
due to various reasons.
1 Municipal finance through public debt, local fees, profits from
municipal enterprises, sales of property has already reached natural or institutional lim-
its. The fiscal autonomy of municipalities is weakening rapidly as municipal expendi-
tures rise while revenues decrease.
Adapting the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations to the new circumstances is
a challenge. The allocation of tasks and the distribution of financial resources between
the tiers of government is particularly important. In Germany the latter involves the
systems of vertical financial relations among EU, federal government and states (Bund-
Länder Finanzausgleich), the horizontal equalisation among states (Länderfinanzaus-
gleich) and the vertical intergovernmental relations between a state and its municipali-
ties (kommunaler Finanzausgleich). Local finance and municipal fiscal autonomy is
thus influenced by all three systems.
When considering the assignment of tasks among the levels of government and the
related financial coverage, the prevailing constitutional competencies should ideally be
related to the connection principle, which suggests that public tasks should only be
shifted or newly introduced to a local level if federal and state governments provide
municipalities with sufficient financial means to execute these additional functions. In
the framework of vertical intergovernmental resource allocation system conditional
grants may serve to prevent fiscal autonomy of municipalities. Many experts argue for a
clearer separation of tax resources and fiscal autonomy among the tiers of government,
in particular between states and municipalities.
Fiscal autonomy of municipalities is also indirectly touched by changes in the hori-
zontal fiscal equalisation from the states with above-average to those with below-
average fiscal capacity and by changes in vertical fiscal relations between federal and
state governments. Local finance is more directly related to the vertical fiscal equalisa-
tion between states and respective municipalities. Therefore, fiscal autonomy is strongly
influenced by the rules concerning the grant systems that prevail in European countries
and by the extent to which public expenditures can be shifted  from higher level juris-
dictions to municipalities without providing sufficient financial means. We mainly
analyse the following questions:
(1) How is public finance differently developed in selected European countries?
                                           
1 In Germany, for example, municipalities are confronted with numerous problems: deficient system of
intergovernmental fiscal relations, policies of the EU regarding the local economic and social activi-
ties, federal policies in the course of European integration, inappropriate privatisation policy, trans-
formation process from socialist to market economy and weak economic growth as well as unfavour-
able population development.2
(2) How can fiscal autonomy of municipalities be protected?
(3) Is the principle of connection applicable for protecting municipal fiscal autonomy?
(4) How can fiscal municipal autonomy be improved within the system of conditional
grants?
(5)  To what extent does the application of the principle of parallelism in the frame-
work of unconditional grants affect municipal autonomy?
2. Development of Local Public Finance in European Countries
2.1. An Overview on Local Finance in Germany, Poland, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom
Four European countries were chosen to survey the development of municipal finance:
the UK, Germany, Poland and Switzerland. Germany and the UK are EU members;
Germany is also in the euro zone. Poland is an EU candidate. Regarding the national
constitution the UK is centrally structured, while Switzerland and Germany are federal
states. Poland also guarantees a substantial degree of municipal autonomy but which is
limited compared to that of Germany and Switzerland. Moreover, Poland and (the east-
ern part of) Germany are transition economies. Among the selected EU nations and
candidates, Germany is the only country currently suffering from the difficulties of sat-
isfying the Maastricht convergence criteria. Switzerland would probably be at the
Maastricht limits if it were a member. The UK and Poland presently belong to those
European countries with an above-average GDP growth rate, whereas Switzerland and
Germany have recently experienced a rather moderate or low growth. The number of
native inhabitants of European origin is gradually shrinking in countries like Germany
and the UK. On the other hand, the size of the Swiss population has remained rather
stable, whereas this problem is not an important issue in Poland at present.
The relative importance of municipal activities can be expressed by municipal ex-
penditure related to total government expenditures or to GDP shown in Table 1. For a
given year of the 1990s these figures for federal countries like Germany and Switzer-
land do not largely differ from those for the unitary nations such as Poland and the UK.
The size of financial transfers indicates the extent of the dependency of municipalities
in relation to the higher tiers of government. Its share has recently grown up to over
75% of all British municipal revenues. The comparable share amounts to 60% in Po-
land. In Germany this kind of dependency is less significant. In Switzerland financial
transfers from the cantons cover less than 20% of the municipal expenditures. To a large
extent Swiss municipalities cover their expenditures by fees and charges. This source is
also significant in Germany but for Poland and the UK its share (of total municipal3
revenues) is much lower. The share of tax receipts of total municipal finance is high in
Switzerland at about 45%, followed by Poland and Germany at ca. 20%. For the cate-
gory of municipal borrowings the share for Poland, Switzerland and the UK is negligi-
ble. This fact correlates well with the intensity of municipal investment.
2
2.2. Comparison of the Local Finance Development of the Four Euro-
pean Countries
2.2.1. Comparing Municipal Finance in England and Poland
3
For both Poland and England, total revenues of municipalities increased greatly over the
10-year periods studied (England: 1990-1999, Poland: 1992/3-2001). In England, total
revenues for local authorities increased over 35% in this period (see Table a5 in Annex).
Poland achieved a five-fold expansion (Table a6 in Annex). Similar trends for both
countries during this time period were: (1) declines in revenues from local taxes, (2)
tapering of non-tax revenues, and (3) increase in intergovernmental grants.
In England, the largest categories of expenditures included education, personal social
services, protective services and the social housing grant (Table a7 in Annex). In Po-
land, expenditures on education, transport and telecommunication services, welfare, and
public administration increased the most (Table a8 in Annex).
4 On the contrary, a severe
decrease in spending was observed for the communal and dwelling economy.
While the central governments in both England and Poland claim that municipalities
enjoy ample local governance, constrained fiscal powers through the central govern-
ment targeting systems or specific grants, for example, create financial bottlenecks for
                                           
2  The share of investment outlays to total municipal expenditures has recently amounted to ca. 20% in
Germany, 32% in Switzerland and approximately 23% in Poland, whereas the same figure reached
only 10% in the UK. The major share of public investments is carried out by municipalities in Ger-
many, whereas the Polish share is also remarkable at over 50%. Although Swiss municipalities have
actively invested, their share has reached a relatively low level of under 20%. In the UK local authori-
ties account for app. 40% of general government investment expenditures (Table 1). Access to capital
market for municipalities is free in countries like Germany and Switzerland, but this can only be pos-
sible with the approval of central governments in the UK and Poland. Borrowings in foreign currency
are possible with consent in Germany but quite rare in the UK, Switzerland, and Poland. Rules over
terms of loans exist in Germany with regard to asset life, possibility of serving credit through cash
flow, etc., while only few rules are found in Switzerland, the UK and Poland (King and Jequier, 2003,
p. 20).
3  England and Poland, two countries with different histories and economic developments, are consid-
erably similar with regards to the structure and development of local government.
4  In Poland, municipalities only recently were handed over the responsibility of local education at the
kindergarten, primary school, and grammar school level. They were not, however, given additional fi-
nancing for this duty. Similarly, transportation and infrastructure in Poland is often financed through
specific grants from the central government.4
municipalities. In addition, limitations placed on sources of taxation, rates of taxation,
and credit approvals further restrict financial independence.
5
Access to credit has also been a continual problem for municipalities in England and
Poland. In England, the Local Government and Housing Act passed by Parliament in
1989 issued a complicated procedure of credit approvals for all classes of borrowing.
Even after the later abolishment of stipulations requiring all local authorities to retain
capital receipts in the case of debt, the strict regulations on credit approvals remained
intact. Thus, credit remains a small source of income for municipalities in England. In
Poland, according to Nam and Parsche (2001), income generated from municipal bonds
and commercial/preferential loans amounted to an average of 3% of total income for the
time period 1994-98. This minute contribution to yearly income reflects the central gov-
ernment reluctance in allowing municipalities to incur excessive debt, and a desire by
central authorities to manage the country’s overall debt level.
The development of local finance in Poland was primarily affected by:
•   Tax reforms and the ongoing fiscal decentralisation
•   Transformation including the privatisation process
•   Relatively large sum of intergovernmental transfers
•   Increasing financial burden caused by the rapid expansion of expenditure needs
•   Rather stable development of investment expenditure of local government
•   Strong increase in education expenditure.
The development of local finance in England was primarily affected by:
•   Dominant role of the central government for local finance matters
•   Decreases in local tax and fee revenues but increases in the size of down-flow grants
to municipalities
•   Strict standards and guidelines set by the central government for local services and
restriction of municipal borrowing
•   Gradually decreasing local capital expenditures
•   Dominance of education expenditure gradually loses significance but the expenditure
share for social services experiences a rapid growth
                                           
5  In 1990 the rating of revenues for non-domestic properties (revenues collected mainly on commercial
and industrial properties) for local authorities in England was altered. Prior to this, non-domestic rates
(NDRs), which make up a sizeable portion of revenues collected by local governments, were set ac-
cording to each individual municipality. In April 1990, a single poundage was set forth by the central
government as the national non-domestic rate (NNDR). In Poland, while political independence was
heralded, statutes limiting the independence of municipality finance were promulgated. Legal statutes
specified not only permissible sources for municipal tax revenues but also placed limits on tax levying.
For example, maximum tax rates for immovable goods, rural immovable goods, transportation means,
and forest taxes are all clearly delineated.5
•   EU liberalisation, competition and subsidy policies also affect municipalities and
municipal firms
•   Budget consolidation policy in general.6
Table 1
Significance of Municipal Finance in Selected Member Countries of the Council of Europe
Municipal Expenditure
in relation to GDP and
General Government
Expenditure (GGE)
Municipal Investment Expenditure in
relation to Total Municipal Expendi-
ture (TME), to General Government
Investment Expenditure (GGIE) and
to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Sources of Municipal Funding in relation to Total Municipal Revenue
(%)



























































































































































































































































































































































Source: King and Jaquer (2000), p. 19, 23 and 278
2.2.2. Comparison of Germany and Switzerland
6
After unification, local revenues in Germany increased from € 114 billion in 1990 to €
166 billion in 1996 but decreased to € 146 billion in 1999 (Table a1 in Annex). This fact
reflects partly the unification boom in the municipalities of the former GDR. Local
revenues also gradually increased in Switzerland, which suffered, however, from a se-
vere drop to Sfr. 38 billion in1997 due mainly to the reduction of tax receipts (Table a3
in Annex).
Tax revenues for German municipalities increased gradually until 1999, with slight
business cycle fluctuations. This is more or less directly led by the participation of (west
German) municipalities in income taxation and to the local business tax, i.e. a tax on
profit.
7 Moreover, German municipalities have increased the property and business tax
rates. Taxes are also a main source of revenues for municipalities in Switzerland. How-
ever, the share of this item to total revenues has been reduced over the years due to the
shrinking consumption taxes and the stable development of revenues from income and
property taxes. With the exception of 1997, tax revenues continued to rise until 1999.
Intergovernmental grants constitute a significant portion of municipality revenues in
Germany. Unconditional grants, which primarily serve to finance current expenditures
in the fields of education, culture, social welfare, health, municipal public facilities and
municipal firms, also partly assist in debt servicing and investment financing for local
infrastructure projects. Investments grants remained relatively stable although the rela-
tion between current and investment grants has changed continuously in favour of the
former type.
8 After 1996, when grants had reached a peak, expenses in social welfare
were reduced.
9 This occurred particularly in the western municipalities. In Switzerland,
                                           
6  In Germany the central government (Federal Government, Bund), the 16 state governments (Länder),
and local governments consisting of 13837 municipalities (Gemeinden, towns) and 440 cities (117
kreisfreie Städte) and counties (323 Kreise) make up the existing government bodies. In Switzerland
government entities consist of the central government (Federal Government or Bund), the 26 state
governments (cantons), and local governments of which 2880 are municipalities (Gemeinden, towns).
Furthermore, the cantons are divided by 176 districts, although some cantons like Uri, Zug and Ap-
penzell have no districts. In contrast to the case in Germany the existence of Swiss municipalities is
not guaranteed in the constitutions of the federal government and the cantons. Nonetheless, there is an
unwritten law regarding their autonomy, although they legally function as an enforcement agency for
the cantons. Thus, the administrative and fiscal activities of cantons and municipalities are closely in-
terwoven and the terms ‘joint execution’ and ‘joint responsibility’ are often used.
7  In east Germany tax revenues maintained a share of only 5% of total municipal revenues, whereas this
figure amounted to nearly 30% for municipalities in the West.
8  In the eastern part of Germany, over 50% of all local revenues were based on grants due to lagging tax
revenues. During the transformation process investment grants continually played an important role.
Due to the reduction of expenses for services and the respective number of staff, outsourcing of serv-
ices, privatisation, etc., current grants did not grow strongly in general.
9  This is the consequence of new regulations related to asylum seekers, health care for the elderly peo-
ple, further outsourcing and service reductions, changes in legal forms of public facility activities and
reduction in local investments.9
grants from the central government and the respective cantons to municipalities grew
gradually between 1990 and 1999. The conditional grants have served to cover current
expenses associated with schools, hospitals, roads, culture, and the environment such as
water protection, cleaning etc. Conditional grants for infrastructure investments were,
however, gradually reduced. Unconditional grants have traditionally been less signifi-
cant compared to the conditional grants.
During the investigated period municipal revenues from fees increased in Germany
until 1995 but decreased thereafter. The reduction in personnel costs, the outsourcing of
local activities, the establishment of municipal firms as well as the closing down of in-
stitutions and privatisation all contributed to the fee decrease. Mainly, this development
took place under budget consolidation of western and eastern German municipalities.
During the investigated period of 1990-99, revenues from municipal fees increased con-
siderably in Switzerland. The main reason for this has been the difficulties encountered
in raising tax rates. Since current costs such as staff costs, material costs, interests or
depreciation allowances increased, municipalities were forced to charge higher prices.
Revenues from the business performance of municipal firms also increased in Ger-
many. This was partly due to the transfer of legally dependent local facilities to public
firms and policies aimed at consolidating municipal firms. In the new states municipal
firms were newly established and losses have been reduced. On the other hand, there
was an active privatisation process of firms making not only profits but also losses
there.
10 Privatisation and budget consolidation policies in Germany also influenced local
revenues from the sale of municipal property, which peaked in 1996. However, the sale
of stock share of public or mixed firms was highest in 1998 as a result of competition
and market liberalisation policies of the EU in the energy sector. Also difficulties in
publicly-provided local housing in the new states as well as the introduction of public-
private-partnership in the provision of infrastructure including water supply etc., led to
the higher sale of shares. In Switzerland revenues from municipal firms’ performance
and the sale of municipal property also increased in the 1990s. To a lesser extent than
the German case, this is partly due to the transfer of legally dependent public facilities
to public firms and increasing prices for public services to consolidate municipal firms.
Yet the sale of municipal property contributed to a lesser extent to the increase in local
revenues.
Net crediting of German municipalities increased only slightly cumulating in 1993
but dissipating afterwards as a consequence of budget consolidation policies and trans-
                                           
10  European competition policies have gradually reduced the profits of municipal firms, especially in the
energy sector where charges for concessions to use the municipal territories by energy firms came un-
der pressure.10
ferring public debt to municipal firms.
11 During this time, municipalities in both parts of
Germany borrowed from capital markets and other public institutions. Rather strict
regulations on municipal debt has linked local investment with the fiscal capacities of
municipalities. An important determinant of municipal debt has been a mixed funding
of public programmes in which municipalities share the financial burden with the fed-
eral and state governments. The amount of net credits of Swiss municipalities increased
from 1990 to 1996 due mainly to the fluctuation of the business cycle. The consequent
negative trend has turned positive again since 1999 as a consequence of budget consoli-
dation policies. Clear municipal debt regulations have existed as in Germany.
12 The
municipality may also enforce a municipal merger in the case of extreme high debts.
Important financial sources have been the so-called mixed programmes for which mu-
nicipalities share the financial burden with the central government and the cantons.
Total expenditures in Germany increased until the mid-1990s, afterwards stagnating
at a high level (Table a2 in Annex). In western municipalities staff expenses peaked in
1995 but declined slightly in the following years, whereas east German municipalities
were further forced to finance a large scale public employment.
13 Current expenditures
grew steadily, in particular expenses for goods and services of former West German
states, while this item capped in 1995 and diminished afterwards. Current local ex-
penses for social aid increased continuously in both parts of Germany until 1995.
Thereafter new federal laws were promulgated directing insurance agencies to care for
the elderly and placing limits on social aid and reduced nursing fees. Municipal invest-
ments were highest in 1992, dropping continuously until 1999, which is also led by ur-
gent budget consolidation efforts. Outsourcing and privatisation of public utilities also
reduced municipality investment expenses.
14 Municipal interest payments cumulated in
1996 but decreased thereafter. In the West, municipalities attempted to use debt conver-
sions and thus benefited from low interest rates. East German municipalities increased
their debt and had fewer opportunities for using debt conversions. Municipalities in
west Germany applied new instruments of cash and debt management.
15
                                           
11  East German municipalities were particularly forced to take a large scale credits between 1991 and
1993.
12  Moreover, special agreements among the parliamentary counsel or inhabitants of the municipality are
required to keep credit balances in check.
13  These personnel expenses, however, dropped gradually: in 1992 eastern municipalities maintained a
ratio of 143% staff expenses per capita compared to western cities. In the east German states, many lo-
cal services (such as nursery schools) have been provided by public administration which have been,
on the other hand, partly offered by religious institutions in west Germany. Outsourcing and spin-offs
of public utilities and services also contributed to staff reductions.
14  Population development is likely to further increase investment needs in metropolitan areas in the
western German states, but lower needs in the municipalities of the new states.
15 These include inter-municipal clearing and derivatives trade, such as interest swaps, forward rate
agreements, cap, floor and collar businesses, etc. Moreover, municipalities have made themselves ac-
cessible to the European credit and capital markets (Rehm and Matern-Rehm, 2003).11
Total expenditures of Swiss municipalities increased in the investigated period. Only
in 1997 was there a slight reduction of expenditures due to an unusual drop in current
personnel expenses (Table a4 in Annex). Staff expenditures also increased gradually,
amounting to ca 35% of total expenditures in 1999.
16 Additionally, expenses for materi-
als, components and services also grew steadily, reaching around 17% of total munici-
pal expenses in 1999. Current expenses for municipal social welfare also expanded as
well, corresponding to nearly one third of all current expenses in 1999. Investment ex-
penses for construction, new equipment, etc. were highest in 1997 but dropped con-
secutively afterwards. Municipal interest payments cumulated until 1996 but decreased
during the course of budget consolidation.
Expenditures concerning municipal organisation and management
17 have remained
stable in Germany after a strong increase in years following unification. Expenditures
for sports, health and leisure reached a peak in 1992 and gradually descended after-
wards. A similar development took place for housing and traffic expenditures. After
1992 expenses for public facilities and business promotion were reduced considerably.
Expenditures related to municipal firms show a similar development. In the 1990s a
gradual increase in expenditure took place in social welfare and general finance.
The expenditures concerning municipal organisation and management have also
slowly increased in Switzerland. A comparable development was also observed with
regard to the spending for housing and traffic. Defence expenditures were, however,
reduced. A steady annual growth was identified for the items like the augmented social
transfers and general finance of municipalities. For social welfare a transfer of tasks
from the central government and the cantons to municipalities appears to continue with-
out the corresponding, sufficient provision of financial means.
The development of local finance in Germany was particularly influenced by:
•   Tax reforms weakening the fiscal autonomy of municipalities, and partially reducing
tax revenues
•   Huge sum of grants from other tiers of government
•   Shift of financial burdens to localities
•   Increase of expenditures for social aid and welfare services
•   Reduction of local investments, especially in western municipalities
•   Transformation process in the eastern part also regarding the municipal activities,
their organisation, functional and territorial reforms, provision of facilities and local
investments
                                           
16  Salary developments, shorter working hours, implementation of stringent regulations and an integrated
administrative enforcement formed by the three tiers of government have led to the rapid cost increase
in health care, environmental protection, education and internal security.
17  These include, for example, expenses for security, education, science, research and cultural affairs.12
•   EU liberalisation, competition and subsidisation policies with respect to municipali-
ties and enterprises
•   Budget consolidation policies to fulfil the Maastricht criteria.
The development of local finance in Switzerland was particularly affected by:
•   Highly interwoven administrative and fiscal system between the tiers of government
•   Strong reliance on income and property taxation
•   Large grants from other tiers of government
•   Shift of financial burdens to localities
•   Increase of expenditures for social services
•   Reduction of local investments
•   Higher European and global competition
•   Budget consolidation policies.
2.3. Dangers for Fiscal Autonomy from Problems of Local Finance in
the Four Countries
All four countries underwent tax reforms; their municipalities depend heavily on verti-
cal grants and were subject to municipal restructuring policies (Table 2). Municipalities
in western Europe have all been faced with increased regional and global competition as
well as EU-policies. They have reduced local infrastructure investment and have had to
increase expenditures for social aid. With the exception of England, where the fiscal
autonomy is quite low on the local level, the financial situation of municipalities has
deteriorated. Additional problems have emerged in Poland and Germany because of
transformation necessities. In all the selected countries there is an urgent need to protect
municipalities financially and to ensure their fiscal autonomy from the intervention of
the higher government level to enable the self-governing of local activities.
There appear to be several ways to improve the financial situation of municipalities
(Fisher, 1996; Pola, 1996; Drennan and Netzer, 1997; Blankart and Borck, 2000; Cas-
tellucci, 2000, Hedtkamp, 2000, Dafflon, 2002).However, only some of them lead to a
higher fiscal autonomy. Weaker legal requirements to increase local debt can enhance
municipal autonomy in the short run. On the other hand, credits have to be paid back
and interest payments reduce the scope of financing expenditures.
The sale of municipal real estate, firms, assets and other forms of property may lead
to a short-term liquidity effect. If these revenues are used to pay back local debts the
financial situation may become healthy. However, if this local property is necessary for
public production, the situation can be even worsened, especially if expensive, profit-
oriented private services are procured to provide the public services. A decrease of fu-13
ture autonomy can also be a consequence, because of lacking revenues from the prop-
erty and higher dependencies on private production and markets as well as the lack of
own know-how in the production of some local services.
In all four countries municipal fees have been increased considerably, which led to an
increase in revenues from this item. As long as profits were yielded, municipal fiscal
autonomy was widened. However, higher fee revenues that stem from higher sales on
the basis of given fees require higher production, thus neutralising the higher turnover
by the higher total costs. In some countries there are laws that stipulate cost coverage of
local firms but do not allow profit making. Therefore, an increase in fees only tempo-
rarily eases fiscal stress. More benefits may result from transferring municipalities’
rights to private economic units against concession payments. Such rights include rights
to provide energy, to organise passenger traffic, to use the municipal territory for stor-
age, to organise markets, to use urban land for manufacturing, housing, gas lines, elec-
tricity and communication lines.
Municipal fiscal autonomy can be enhanced if municipalities are able to apply (and
expand) own local taxes and rates leading to higher tax revenues. In all four countries
there is an ongoing debate concerning tax reforms to provide them sufficient tax re-
ceipts. As the tax systems in the four countries are different, the recommendations to
change municipal taxation will differ extensively from one to another. Yet the popular
taxation principles that could be applied universally include (1) the non-business cycle
sensitive tax basis, (2) the broad tax basis aimed at encompassing many citizens in
taxation, (3) the taxes levied on those economic units that receive infrastructure services
from the municipality, (4) the taxing of non-migrating tax objects, etc.
Generally, municipal autonomy is widened by a higher scope of self-government, e.g.
decision making on a variety of tasks. There is an improved chance of maximising mu-
nicipal welfare, given the financial and fiscal restrictions. The more tasks the munici-
palities are obliged to fulfil without receiving funds, the more restricted their autonomy
will be. A farther-reaching increase in municipal autonomy requires that the revenues
are also expanded. This can be arranged through an expansion of grants. In all four
countries conditional and unconditional grants exist. The conditional grants can be pro-
vided according to the principle of connection between the assignment of local activities
and their finance (see chapter 3). In this sense the unconditional grants do not enhance
autonomy much. The system of unconditional grants should be changed in favour of
higher autonomy of the municipalities by introducing particular rules of allocation of
funds to grants addressed to municipalities.
Therefore, we concentrate on the grant systems with respect to application of the
connection principle, the shaping of conditional grants and introducing a principle of
parallelism into the allocation process of unconditional intergovernmental transfers.14
Also relevant to all four countries we refer to Germany as an example that shows a
rather sophisticated and legally regulated grant system.15
Table 2
Major Determinants of Local Finance Development in the Investigated European Countries in the 1990s




















Germany X X X X X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X X X X
England X X X X X X X
Poland X X X X X16
3. Fiscal Equalisation to Protect Municipalities by Conditional Grants
3.1. Some Fiscal Issues Surrounding the Principle of Connection in
Germany
Due mainly to the critical fiscal stress of local governments, the issue of protecting mu-
nicipalities against the downward shift of tasks from higher levels of governments while
leaving the fiscal burden to municipalities has become increasingly popular (Henneke,
2003).
18 The German federal constitution (Article 28, Paragraph 2) assign a number of
tasks to local authorities as well as the responsibility to execute certain functions. These
tasks comprise activities of self-government where local authorities are free to choose as
well as obligatory self-government where they can freely perform the respective tasks.
With other public tasks they are mainly executing functions of other government levels.
Within these fields of actions the scope of decision-making of local authorities is not
totally protected by the constitution (Klein, 2003).
In the state constitutions the connection principle is stipulated. A state should reallo-
cate public activities to municipalities only if it offers sufficient financial resources to
them required to execute these new local functions (Trapp, 1997, p. 185; Henneke 2003,
p. 142). In Germany there are debates on the extent of legal obligations to provide the
appropriate financial means according to the connection principle (Schneider, 1998, p.
3759, Kirchhof, 2002; Klein, 2003). As there are three tiers of government, the question
is whether the federal government is able to transfer tasks to municipalities leaving the
financial burden to them. Article 104a of the constitution does not protect municipalities
from the transfer of tasks that creates additional financial burdens for them (Trapp,
1997, p. 217). Examples are social assistance for adults, youth and children (Bull and
Welti, 1998; Henneke, 2002). Although local governments are safeguarded by Article
28 of the constitution, and municipalities can apply to a state constitutional court, they
are legally unprotected if the respective state constitutional court does not bring the case
to the Federal Constitutional Court (Klein, 2003, p. 4). Therefore, the federal govern-
ment can give municipalities unfunded mandates. An open problem is how to treat these
mandates in laws on intergovernmental fiscal relations (Grundlach, 2000).
A simple solution appears to be forcing the higher-level government to cover the
costs of administering public functions, as stipulated in Article 104 of the constitution.
Although the states are responsible for executing most of the EU and federal laws, they
                                           
18  In Germany the finance of public activities and performance of tasks does not follow the power to
formulate laws but primarily the obligation to execute laws (Article 104 a, Paragraph 1 of the cosnti-
tution). Finance is connected with the power of administration. Therefore, financial obligations are
mostly with the states, which are to administer public functions. In cases of the federal administration
(Article 84 Paragraph 1 of the constitution) the central government must finance the carrying out of a
task and not the states or the municipalities.17
can only claim that part of costs that results from the administrative activities of the
states. The difficulty arises in determining the amount of relevant costs (Trapp, 1997, p.
244, Schoch, 2000). Are municipalities free to influence the amount of costs because
they have the autonomy to perform tasks, or should higher levels of government be able
to determine an amount they are willing to pay, such as standard costs? The first possi-
bility may lead to higher administrative costs, since local management can determine
costs such as to maximise its own welfare or utility. The realisation of the second alter-
native may cause low payments, as higher tiers of governments maximise their utility
by leaving the political and financial difficulties to the municipalities. A debate on fair
costs to be met can be expected in this context. Appropriate rules must be formulated to
obtain acceptable solutions. Some kind of bargaining Nash solutions may also emerge.
If the higher rank of government is powerful, the principal-agent approaches can serve
to fix the amount of cost covering. A municipality may execute the task according to a
minimum utility constraint, and the task performance by the municipality will lead to
different levels of utility of the higher-level government. The payment to cover costs
reduces the utility of the higher rank of government. The transfer to municipalities is to
maximise higher government net utility while ensuring efficient performance of the
municipalities. In a deterministic case the optimal amount of payment must equalise the
marginal net benefit of the higher-level government with the marginal utility of the low-
level government. Special solutions result if risk is involved. According to the kind of
risks, constant payments or payments that vary with the level of performance are opti-
mal. To identify cost and its coverage, the incentive contract theory may also be ap-
plied. There may be an appropriate split of possible cost savings that causes the effec-
tive performance by the municipality and relatively low financial transfers by the higher
rank municipality.
A further approach may be to compensate municipalities by stipulating a larger scope
for taxation (Blankart and Borck, 2000). In this framework questions arise as to which
kinds of taxes are appropriate for this purpose. Should municipalities be able to enlarge
the tax base of business taxes or should their contribution from the business tax paid to
higher-level governments be reduced? Should the restrictions on rates of land and busi-
ness taxes be simpler? If a new tax is allowed, should it be an addition to income taxa-
tion or a further turnover tax (Bull and Welti, 1996; Zimmermann 1999)? Can new mu-
nicipal taxes be introduced on packages, animals other than dogs, or on electronic
communication? Severe problems of conformity with the general system of taxation
may arise. If the states formulate requirements for local taxation, these problems can be
reduced. On the one hand, this policy may give incentives for minimising costs for pub-
lic functions transferred, but the tax receipts may not be large enough to cover the costs
for fulfilling the task.18
Another possibility to ensure cost-saving task performance can be the coverage of
expenditures in terms of fees collected for respective services. This guarantees that
services related to the transferred task are delivered to economic units that are able to
pay. Increases of already existing fees may conflict with existing state laws that stipu-
late the principles of public fee determination, such as average cost pricing. Moreover, a
non-lump sum treatment of services, etc. can be introduced.
Compensation by shifting federal or state property located in the respective munici-
pality or fungible assets such as bonds, etc., to the municipalities carrying out additional
tasks can be considered. The incidence of performing new tasks can be compensated by
lowering the conditions required for borrowings by easing the cash flow requirements
for raising municipal credits that can be done by the state’s municipal budget control
office. State banks can provide credit to municipalities in a more easy way. This solu-
tion appears inadequate as the states or the central government will reallocate the debt
burden to municipalities. This policy is similar to the local policy of switching their
future borrowings to their municipal firms.
Another principle related to the connection principle is that of participation in politi-
cal decision-making when public tasks are reallocated or new activities are shifted to
municipalities (Henneke, 2003). Therefore, municipalities should also be involved in
the state or federal legislation process
19. Yet, it appears to be difficult to expand the
participation of municipalities. Law-making has become more complicated in parlia-
ments, and new bureaucratic routines, planning and participation schemes are required
for government actions.
Furthermore, compensation for financial burdens related to new tasks may be consid-
ered in the framework of fiscal equalisation in terms of intergovernmental grants. Con-
ditional grants may be adapted to meet additional municipal financial requirements,
encouraging reforms of the vertical fiscal equalisation system between a state and its
municipalities.
3.2. Conditional Grants
In Poland vertical fiscal relations exist between the central government and the munici-
palities. Vertical fiscal equalisation is partly achieved by conditional and unconditional
grants. The latter type is provided with reference to population, schools and a grant
serving to substitute losses caused by shifting the car tax to the central government
(Borodo, 2003). Moreover, counties and woiwodships receive a general unconditional
                                           
19 This type of approach supporting the application of the connection principle seems to be important
because of the EU and federal policies on competencies, autonomy and financial flexibility of munici-
palities.19
grant for roads. The amount of unconditional grants is fixed in the central government
budget annually.
In the UK there is a dominating two tier system with the central government and mu-
nicipalities within different levels of local authorities.
20 Unconditional central govern-
ment grants — one of the major revenues for municipalities — have been rather vola-
tile, thus making in some cases amendments in the local taxation necessary (see also
Bennett and Krebs, 1988).
Switzerland has a vertical fiscal equalisation system between the central government
and the cantons, on the one hand, and that between a canton and its municipalities on
the other. It uses conditional and unconditional grants. A horizontal fiscal equalisation
among the cantons comparable to that in Germany among the states does not exist but is
going to be introduced through a contract system among the cantons to pay for benefits
from spill-overs (Frey and Schaltegger, 2003). This new system will also be considered
within the vertical equalisation between the central government and the cantons since
the sub-national fiscal capacity should match the sub-national expenditure needs. The
cantons and the central government finance the equalisation of fiscal capacities, whereas
the need equalisation comprises a split of federal grants to the cantons with mountain-
ous areas and those with population agglomerations (Frey and Schaltegger, 2003).
Germany has a fiscal equalisation between the central government and the states that
is made primarily by determining the shares of joint tax revenues through conditional,
federal grants to the states and through splitting the financial burden of expenditures
between these two government levels for common tasks. There is a horizontal equalisa-
tion among the states as well. However, the expanded vertical equalisation occurs be-
tween a state and its municipalities through conditional and unconditional grants.
There are several types of conditional grants in the four investigated countries. We
considered conditional grants provided to execute a local activity, which is originally a
function of a central state or a sub-state but transmitted to municipalities.Other condi-
tional grants  are to support specified municipal tasks (Arnold and Geske, 1988; Smith,
2003). For their specification no general theory for optimal conditional grants exists. A
normative approach relates to the consumer’s net-benefit maximisation in the frame-
work of a principle-agent relation. A higher level jurisdiction — the “principal”—
maximises net-benefits, considering that a part of the net-benefits must be allocated to
the “agent” municipality to ensure local efforts to achieve the best performance of ac-
tivities. Under the certainty condition, the marginal net-benefit of higher level jurisdic-
tions must equal the marginal net-benefit allocated to the assigned municipality in anal-
                                           
20  These levels include, for example, England, Wales and Scotland, upper tier authorities (metropolitan
counties, non-metropolitan counties, regions), lower tiers authorities (London boroughs, metropolitan
districts, non-metropolitan districts, districts), special purpose and unitary authorities (education
authority, metropolitan police, islands councils), and towns.20
ogy to Gravelle and Rees (1992). If no necessities for participation of the agent in net-
benefit exist, the optimal conditional grant is to maximise the sum of both net-benefits.
Conditional grants designed in accordance with a more general support scheme cannot
be adapted to individual municipalities to shape an optimal one. Therefore, when the
conditions of optimal grants are considered, including the reaction of municipalities
within a principal-agent relation, one may assume a representative municipality to fix
the rules.
21 In such schemes risk can also be introduced. If the risk is associated with
difficulties in detecting the output level, it makes sense to offer municipalities the same
level of goal realisation. If grant provision to the municipality depends on an upper-
level decision-maker who is not able to identify non-observable different efforts of the
municipality, then an increasing participation should be allowed to the municipality.
Therefore, different sizes of conditional grants result from this principle-agent situation
(Coutry and Marschke, 2003; Grout and Stevens, 2003), when the different municipal
activity levels are to be achieved. If the high-level government is able to provide differ-
ent and individual amounts of support or if it has the power to decide individually on
the size of conditional grants, the usual principal-agent relation changes to a game be-
tween principal and agent as shown below.
22
                                           
21  Other goals like welfare maximisation may also be applied for the jurisdictions. If both the state and
the municipality attempt to maximise employment, then total employment may be better maximised
by the higher rank jurisdiction. However, a minimum employment level must be guaranteed to the
municipality to ensure its efforts to perform policies which allow overall high employment within the
state. The minimal employment has to be then gradually increased according to higher efforts made
(or to be made). Again marginal total employment must equal to marginal minimal municipal em-
ployment.
22 Negotiation of Conditional Grant:
Utility of state:
F g X g U ! Max FL XL L ⋅ − ⋅ =          (1)
gXL: value of activity or investment unit X to the state
gFL: value of 1 unit of grant F to the state
Utility of municipality:
F g X ) X b a ( U ! Max FG G ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − =         (2)
a,b: parameters of evaluation of activities X
gFG: value of 1 unit of grant F to the municipality
For both actors exists a set of indifference curves. Solutions of negotiations are related to a sequence
of tangency points of indifference curves of the state and municipality.
For an indifference curve of the state holds:
















=                        (3)
and for that of the municipality analogously:
















=                        (4)
Die Conditions (3) and (4) denote the identity of the Pareto- solution:21
The state government may have an utility function, which depends on the output X of
a municipal project and on the size of a conditional grant F, e.g. - gFL* F + gXL* X where





















=          (5)
The utilities along the identity of the pareto-solution are given by (6):
F g X ) X b a ( U
F g X g U
FG Pareto Pareto G
FL Pareto XL L
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − =












= .          (6)
After the substitution the grant F in (6), we have the following frontier of the utility distribution be-
tween the state and the municipality:



































⋅ = Φ .          (7)
To derive the negotiation solution we maximise the Nash product NP under the constraint of the utility
frontier (7):







ULMin: minimal utility level of the state
UGMin: minimal utility level of the state
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g ⋅ ⋅ < < ⋅ − , the last part of (9) is positive. If the parameter b rises,





g a ⋅ = . Therefore, the grant in-











g ⋅  In regard to a price–demand function as a-b⋅ X, when the municipal activities X ex-
pand, the state is willing to support these, as along as the net advantage gXL⋅ UL–gFL⋅ F increases. If the
willingness of payment for the municipal activities is sufficiently large, then the financial situation of
the municipality is stable without or with the state grant. In this case the grant F will be lower.22
gFL and gXL form utility weights. The utility function UL is depicted in equation (1). Fig-
ure 1 shows a set of indifference curves, which shift to the north-east with growing X.
As F becomes larger the utility level of the indifference curve obtained by the state will
be lower. The municipal utility UG measured in terms of project size X and the amount
F of the conditional grant. The utility function UG is shown by equation (2) and its
shape in Figure 1. On the one hand, it increases with a higher output, reaches the top
and decreases afterwards. On the other hand it grows with the size of the conditional
grant. Therefore, there is a set of indifference curves with different utility levels posi-
tively correlated to the conditional grant. This is also depicted in Figure 1. If the state
and the municipality start the negotiation on the size of the conditional grants, pareto-
optimal points exist at the points of tangency of the indifference curves of the state and
the municipality. There is a range of Pareto-optimal possible solutions related to the
utility levels of the state and municipality. They symbolise a set of possible negotiation
solutions. They are depicted in Figure 2 and its minimum utility is multiplied by the
utility change of the municipality minus municipal minimum utility. This expression is
maximised considering the Pareto-optimal condition mentioned, as in equations (5), (6),
(7) and (8). The derivative to the conditional grant F delivers optimality conditions from
which the Nash conditional grant Fnash and the utilities ULnash  and UGnash are gained
(equations (8)) The output X of the municipal project is determined through equation
(5).
With respect to conditional grants there are four policies to protect municipalities
from losing autonomy in self-government and finance in the framework of conditional
grants. Apart from relating conditional grants more strongly to the connection principle
as a first approach, the power structure and the resource allocation between the state and
municipalities could be altered. Instead of principle-agent situations where the high
power of the state is expressed through simple principal-agent model formulations, the
state should be forced to negotiate conditional grants in a second attempt, thus increas-
ing municipalities’ financial autonomy. More decision power could be given to munici-
palities in regional and urban planning and/or by municipal participation in formulating
public utility functions with respect to conditional grants and the activities and invest-
ments concerned, e.g. through participation in decision making of municipalities on the
state level. The third approach would be to establish rules for co-operative decision-
making between the state and municipalities on some projects and public activities.23
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There are some similar cases in Switzerland. A fourth policy would be to apply a gen-
eral rule of parallel development of fiscal capacities between the state and municipali-
ties for determining the amounts of unconditional grants in fiscal vertical equalisation.
4. Principle of Parallelism to Prevent Fiscal Autonomy through Un-
conditional Grants
4.1. Definition of the Principle of Parallelism
The principle of parallel development of fiscal capacity between a state and its munici-
palities comprises a guideline to determine unconditional grants from the state to the
municipalities (Nam, Parsche and Steinherr, 2001). In Germany, it is legally imple-
mented in the Free State of Saxony (§2 SächsFAG, law of fiscal equalisation). The state
of Brandenburg tries to follow this principle as well (Grundlach, 2000, p. 10). Accord-
ing to this principle, the total amount of the state grants to municipalities is annually
fixed, however, in a far limited way. There should be a parallel development of the mu-
nicipalities’ disposable income from local taxes plus the provided intergovernmental
transfers by the state and the disposable income from the tax income of the state and the
grants from the federal government minus the above-mentioned grants from the state to
the municipalities (Nam and Parsche, 2001, p. 11). Essential for the delineation of this
principle is the term parallelism. Does the parallelism require a one-to-one relation or
can another relation serve as well?
The one-to-one relation implies that the public tasks financed related to the fiscal ca-
pacities are of same importance regardless of the state and the municipalities manifested
in an utility function concerning the state tasks and the municipal tasks. A parallel equal
development of utility changes, however, does not necessarily lead to a one-to-one rela-
tion in changes of expenditures and revenues. Such utility functions do not yet exist. In
reality, there are no binding political statements or juridical rules stipulating, in federal
or state constitutions, that state tasks are of the same importance as municipal ones, al-
though there is a responsibility of a state to finance and influence the local tasks and a25
guarantee of self-administration of municipalities (Kirchhof, 2002) — to some extent,
suggesting the priority of state tasks against municipality tasks.
23
Moreover, a one to one relation implies that the size of tasks of both levels of gov-
ernment is the same. In terms of expenditures this obviously does not hold, as already
mentioned above, with respect to investment outlays. If future-oriented investments are
of high priority they should also be considered as tasks. Then we might end up with
another kind of parallelism. The relation may be three- or two-to-one favouring munici-
palities. A priori, one cannot be explicit on the size of this relation. A public body,
which has the power to determine such a relation according to constitution, must make
decisions on this matter.
In Germany state governments and state parliaments create equalisation funds to be
distributed to municipalities. The fund is collected from the state share of joint taxes,
grants from the central government, revenues from state taxes, contributions from mu-
nicipalities as well as from the finances from the horizontal fiscal relations between the
states. These sources are fixed within a state law concerning the intergovernmental fis-
cal relations between a state and its municipalities. As long as the sources and the law
do not change, there is a relation between the fiscal capacity of the state and the volume
of the equalisation funds. However, no direct link to the total fiscal capacities of the
municipalities exists. The fiscal capacity of municipalities is considered with respect to
the distribution of the equalisation funds, but not when determining the size of the
equalisation funds. Normally, state decision makers do not consider a parallel develop-
ment of fiscal capacity.
24 The kind of parallelism chosen will depend on the aims of
state politicians and municipality-oriented party members in parliament.
                                           
23  The connection principle mentioned above is to protect the local government tasks against crowding-
out by state tasks and federal and EU tasks assigned to the state (Henneke and Vorholz, 2002). There
are also delineation and assignment of public tasks to the government level according to the subsidiar-
ity principle to determine what public tasks should be performed by which level of government. How-
ever, there is no strict evaluation in the sense that given the stock of public tasks, state tasks are more
important than municipal ones (Arnold and Geske, 1988, p. 11; Zimmermann, 1999, p. 73), although
some tasks seem to be more important defined as the so-called common public tasks (Article 91a and b
GG (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben)) and jointly financed programs (Article 104a GG) developed. These ac-
tivities are planned, financed, and in part executed jointly by federal, state and municipal administra-
tions. A high value and importance of local tasks signal the sole competency of local government for
local affairs (Article 28 Paragraph 2 GG). In contrast, stipulations referring to intergovernmental fiscal
relation to taxation show the powerful positions of the federation and states over the municipalities
(Kirchhof, 2002), although local authorities spend most of the public investment expenditures. With
some tasks, a mix of competencies of federation, states and municipalities exists. If considering the
fundamental split of tasks laid down in the federal constitution there is no clear-cut allocation of tasks
to the federation and states (Hohrmann, 1967, p. 180) and tasks are not all assigned (Trapp, 1997, p.
129), with respect to the legal ranking federal law (indirectly also European law) enjoys a higher pri-
ority than a state law and the latter over municipal law.
24  There is a principle-agent problem between the state and the municipalities involved which is solved
and negotiated in formulating the state law of intergovernmental fiscal equalisation.26
Other difficulties stem from the definitions of fiscal capacities on the state and mu-
nicipal level. The definition should express disposable income of the state and that of
municipalities. Disposable income may include the cash flow that is at the disposal of
state government.
25 Therefore, the question is whether disposable state income should
be defined as all revenues minus inevitable expenditures, as is the case with cash flow.
One related problem is whether grants to the municipalities are parts of these inevitable
expenditures. As states must allow municipalities to participate in their tax receipts,
there must be some inevitable grants to the municipalities. However, the share of these
grants is not fixed by the constitution and are therefore variable.
What revenues should be included in disposable income? A state receives financial
revenues from shared taxes, from purpose-oriented, conditional federal grants, uncondi-
tional grants through vertical fiscal equalisation between the federation and states,
grants received through the horizontal equalisation among the states and contributions
from municipalities.
26 Additionally a state has revenues from fees, sanctions, borrow-
ings, sales of state property, profits of state enterprises, etc. What part of these revenues
is disposable income? In the literature on intergovernmental fiscal relations, authors
tend to refer to fiscal capacity considering only with regard to tax revenues instead of
disposable income, including the items suggested above.
27
Does a constant relation between the two indicators imply an appropriate form of
parallel relationship? In case of an agreement achieved about the size of parallelism (see
chapter 4.2.1.), the self-administrative tasks of the state government and municipal gov-
                                           
25  Because many of the revenues are already blocked by expenditures that cannot be changed because
there are juridical obligations, unchangeable in the short run, or invariable, expenditures are necessary
to execute federal (and EU) laws. For governments in Germany such a measure is called ‘free top’
(freie Spitze, freie Spanne in Bavaria).
26  For example, municipalities have to transfer part of the business tax receipts to the state.
27  As both levels of government can raise public credits and should be responsible for their own projects
and tasks of self-administration, an exclusion of public debt makes sense. Fees are considered primar-
ily as payment for services according to the benefit principles of the users or the cost covering princi-
ple. Therefore, they are not at the government’s disposal and should be deducted. Profits from public
state enterprises reflect the willingness to pay of clients for services and should be not considered, ei-
ther. The sale of property increases the disposable revenues within the period of sale. Only if the re-
ceipts are used to decrease public debt in terms of lowering interest payments and capital service does
the disposable income increase. Conditional grants refer to special services or projects related to task
performance of high priority to the central state. It reflects again a willingness to pay and cost cover-
ing. Unconditional grants from other governments increase the municipal financial scope of action,
thus increasing available fiscal means. Sanctions from the EU for non-fulfilment of the Maastricht
criteria have to be deducted insofar the state is responsible. Therefore, it makes a sense to restrict fiscal
capacity to those revenues that are without any equivalent value related to task performance. This rea-
soning calls for the deduction of grants to municipalities to finance municipal tasks. Therefore, dispos-
able income means fiscal capacity from sources without services in exchange, etc. One solution to de-
fine financial municipal disposability is again to refer to the cash flow (free top, freie Spitze, freie
Spanne) of the municipalities, including all the revenues mentioned above minus inevitable existing
expenditure needs.27
ernments may not develop in the same way.
28 According to the game between the state
or the municipalities, and to our empirical findings a higher priority should be given to
municipal self-administrative tasks to compensate private, European, national or state
policy failures. Municipalities are also confronted with effects of natural disasters, war,
population developments as well as economic developments induced by external trade,
currency exchange rates, EU regulations etc., which call for changing the size of paral-
lelism. In general the principle of equal fiscal development may conflict with the goal
achievements of the state, individual municipalities and/or all municipalities.
29 Hope-
fully the application of the parallel development principle will allow a satisfactory goal
fulfilment of the state and municipal decision-makers.
In some states the equalisation funds are split between unconditional grants and in-
vestment grants. The finances dedicated to investments, i.e. conditional grants, have to
be separated from the equalisation funds. A stable form of parallelism implies that some
necessary variations of grants have to take place through conditional grants. This can
lead to an additional loss of autonomy of municipalities. If the principle of connection is
applied when shifting tasks between different levels of government, conditional grants
should be used for compensations to avoid impacts on the application of the principle of
parallel fiscal development. The protagonists of the parallelism principle assume im-
plicitly that the competition among municipalities is not influenced in an undesired way.
The specification of the principle of parallelism can be interpreted as a result of con-
tract negotiations according to the Nash solution between the state and all municipalities
if the municipalities as a whole act as one player. A parallelism of relation one results
out of a Nash-solution if the minimum utility restrictions of the players do not exist and
a symmetric utility distribution of the negotiators prevails with respect to disposable
fiscal capacity. At least an approximate solution should be found. In the case of the
minimum utilities as guaranteed by the constitution or other utility distributions, the
game may lead to another parallelism relation.
For a constant relation of parallelism, the selection of the starting relation is rather
difficult. One attempt is to find a new split-solution through negotiations and the other
one is to select a base year in which the redistribution is considered to be fair and satis-
factory. As politicians disagree on the adequate allocation of financial means on state
and municipalities (Karrenberg and Münstermann, 1999, p. 207), no ideal solution will
be identified. However, a relation might be chosen comprising a year where the fiscal
stress of municipalities and the state was relatively low. When choosing the parallelism,
the effects of parallelism should be taken into account.
                                           
28  According to development of the economy and social conditions the tasks of state, e.g. of science,
education or internal security, achieve more importance than those of municipalities, such as fair
grounds convention sites or historical monument conservation.
29 Regional, urban and environmental planning should not be restricted.28
4.2. Analysis of the Principle of Parallelism
4.2.1. Basic Model for One Type of Municipalities
To analyse the effects of the principle of fiscal development we refer to a simplified
vertical fiscal equalisation system between a German state and its municipalities. A first
type of parallelism, named vertical parallelism, deals with the parallel fiscal develop-
ment between a state and its municipalities. A second type tackles the horizontal paral-
lelism between municipalities or categories of municipalities through vertical uncondi-
tioned grants.
We turn first to the vertical parallelism. An expenditure need indicator is defined as
GB b VE i i ⋅ ⋅ . It refers primarily to the weighted size of population 
i VE  of a municipality.
30
An amount per capita GB
31 is multiplied by the adjusted size of population and
weighted again with a factor bi, which shows the importance of different towns i.
32
Moreover, a tax capacity indicator 
t i SK ,  is taken into account.
33 The unconditional grant
t i SZ ,  is calculated by multiplying the difference between the indicators mentioned above
by an equalisation ratio  AS. This is shown in equation (10).
The total sum of grants paid by the state to municipalities amounts to 
t SZ  as sug-
gested in equation (11). This equation is also used to determine the basic need per capita
GB  as shown by solving equation (11) for GB , which leads to equation (12). Inserting
the result concerning GB  into equation (10) delivers the amount of unconditional grants
paid to municipality i in period t (see equation (13)).
) ( , , t i i i t i SK GB b VE AS SZ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =   (10)
34
                                           
30  There is a major and additional weighting system (Haupt- und Nebenansatz) to determine a need indi-
cator related to population. With the major weighting the number of inhabitants are multiplied by a
factor larger than one, which increases with the population size of cities. The additional weighting
adds changes to this population indicator depending on the number of pupils, central place functions,
etc. An adjusted number of inhabitants (veredelte Einwohnerzahl ) results.
31 GB shows the basic needs per inhabitant, which is the same state-wide. GB is fixed by the state
through simulation so as to distribute an amount fixed by the state in such a way that municipalities
where needs indicator are higher than tax indicators receive grants and the fixed amount (Schlüssel-
masse) becomes exhausted.
32  This matters in the concept of horizontal parallelism through vertical unconditional grant allocation.
The factor 
i b  is related to groups of municipalities. In most German states bi ,(i= 1,…,n) turns out to
be 1. To abstract from problems of horizontal competition we assume  1 = i b  for  n i , , 1 ! =  in our
analysis of the vertical parallelism.
33  The tax capacity index refers to individual tax capacity indices of local taxes (e.g. business tax, real
estate tax, municipal share of income tax). These tax capacities are calculated by using state-wide
normative tax rates.
34
t i SZ , = transfers from the state to a municipality i  (
) 1 ( n i∈
) for a given year t  (Schlüsselzuweisun-
gen);  AS  = the equalisation ratio (Ausgleichsatz); 
i VE  = the weighted number of inhabitant of the
municipality i  (Gesamtansatz); GB  = the basic need per capita (Grundbetrag); 
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35
Parallel development concerns municipalities’ revenues from local taxes  t EG  and
the provided intergovernmental transfers (by the state)  t SZ , on the one hand, and the
state revenues from the (exclusive and shared) taxes and the grants from the federal
government (to the state)  t EL  minus the grants from the state to municipalities  t SZ , on
the other. The size of the intergovernmental transfers is fixed in the period of 0 ( 0 = t )
at a certain percentage share of the income of the state.





































− −      (15)
Therefore, the parallelism is expressed by  ) /( ) ( 0 0 0 0 SZ EL SZ EG − + , which is termed the
size of parallelism. By considering equation (14)
37one finds:















⋅ =      (17)
                                                                                                                               
the municipality i  at the year t  (Steuerkraftmesszahl); 
i b = the factor of horizontal parallelism related
to groups of municipalities
35 
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36 
t SZ  = total sum of down-flow grants from the state to municipalities;  t EG  = tax income of munici-
palities; 
t EL  = tax income of the state and intergovernmental transfers (from other states and the fed-
eral government) to the state at the fiscal year t ).
37  Re-arranging equation (14) yields:

























EL SZ        (16)
According to the principle of parallel development of fiscal capacity between state and municipalities
one finds for period t
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We re-arrange equations (18) and (19) for the period  1 − t :
) ( ) (
0 0
1 1
0 0 1 1 EG EL
EG EL




⋅ + = + − −
− −
,               
) ( ) (
0 0
1 1
0 0 1 1
EG EL
EG EL





⋅ − = −
− −
− −
and insert these expressions into equation (16), thus obtaining (17).30
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∑      (20)
Equation (20) shows the way in which the principle of parallelism is introduced into
the model of vertical fiscal equalisation between the state and municipalities - here with
one municipality.
4.2.2. Consideration of Income and Population Changes
How would changes of tax revenues alter the provision of unconditional grants to that
municipality? This question is tackled under the following assumptions. An income
change 
t i YG , in municipality i in period t changes local tax revenues of municipality i in
period t by  ) ( , , t i t i YG EG . This leads to a variation of the tax capacity indicator of that
community  )) ( ( , , , t i t i t i YG EG SK . However, the income change in municipality i may lead to
income variations ∑
j
t j YG ,  in j other communities as well. This causes a change in reve-
nues of the state  ) ( , ∑
j
t j t YG EL  and a j change in the tax capacities of all respective mu-
nicipalities  ∑
j
t j t j t j YG EG SK )) ( ( , , , . Moreover we assume that that incomes vary with the
population change  )) ( ( : , , , , t i t i t i t i VE YG EG EG =  and  )) ( ( : , , t j
j
t j t t VE YG EL EL ∑ = . Local revenues
depend on income achieved in this community. Moreover, the state revenues are related
to incomes in all municipalities, which are functions of population size.
The formula of unconditional grants of one municipality i (20) turns out to be as fol-
lows:
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     (21)31
Differentiating equation (21) with respect to the weighted population size  t i VE ,  of the
i
th  municipality leads to the following first order condition:
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An increase in the weighted number of inhabitants of a municipality leads to a reduc-









Constant of parallelism ,
0
( ( ( )) ) ( ( )))
0




jt jt jt it jt it jt jt jt
jj j it it
it t





EG YG VE VE VE VE EG YG VE
YG VE EG SZ






+⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −⋅
∂∂ +
<<
∂ ∂ − +⋅ ⋅
∂∂
∑∑ ∑
∑ " # $# % ,, , ,
,
0




)( ( ) )
((() ) ) ((() ) )
(
(( ( ) )
jt it t jt jt
jj t
jt jt jt jt jt it jt jt jt jt
jj j
t
tj t j t i t
j
VE VE EL YG VE
SK EG YG VE VE VE SK EG YG VE
EG EL
AS
























jt it t jt jt
jj it it
it it it it it it
it jt jt
jj it it it it it it
t
YG
VE VE EL YG VE
YG VE
SK EG YG SK EG YG
VE VE VE













"############### # $############### # %
,




() ) ) ( () )
it t
jt jt it jt it t jt jt
jj j it it
YG EL




+⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −⋅
∂∂ ∑∑ ∑
"############### # $############### # %        (23)
This condition depicts two effects. On the one hand an increase of the weighted num-
ber of inhabitants leads to higher unconditional grants. On the other hand, income in-
creases caused by the expansion of population size lead to income growth of firms and
households. Consequently tax capacity grows thus reducing the payments of uncondi-
tional grants. The larger one of the two effects determines whether the amount of un-
conditional grants grows or shrinks, and whether fiscal autonomy is expanded or not.32
This general case comprises special cases.
38 If only income in one municipality varies











it it it it i
it





SK EG SK EG VE
AS EG
VE EG YG EG YG
SZ YG EG SZ
EL VE EL SZ EL YG EL SZ














"########$ # ######### %
     (26)
                                           
38  A more complicated case occurs when a change of income in one municipality also causes changes in
income in other municipalities, which depend on the original income variation of municipality k. This
is expressed by conditions  )) ( ( : , , , , t k t i t i t i YG YG EG EG =  and  )) ( ( : , , t k
j
t j t t YG YG EL EL ∑ = . Again the uncondi-
tional grants are differentiated in terms of the income change 
t k YG , . An expanded derivation is made
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We obtain a similar condition as before. The interpretation is also similar to that above. However, the
sums of revenue changes of state and municipalities play a role in this case. A further expansion con-
siders that with some developments the population varies due to income changes, e.g. through migra-
tion etc. The basic relation for the unconditional grants now becomes more complicated. After differ-
entiation and re-arrangement of terms one obtain equation (25):
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This indicates two effects. The expressions, which have to be larger than the parallelism size, comprise
three terms. The first two terms are positive but the last one is negative. However the second one is to
be subtracted from the first term. Therefore two terms decrease the expression, which in total has to be
larger than the parallelism size if the municipality is going to lose unconditional grants from an in-
come change. A higher income can lead to an increase in population size (e.g. more jobs, more pupils
and families). This fact will again lead to an increase of the needs indicator and the growth of uncon-
ditional grants; however, the increase in income raises tax capacities of municipalities, which has a
counter effect on unconditional grants. Which of the terms determines the fiscal autonomy depends on
the sizes and distributions of the effects.33
In order to avoid a reduction in unconditional grants, which means lowering fiscal
autonomy, a high degree of parallelism and a high positive reaction of state revenues
would be necessary if the first term on the right hand side is positive.
The change of unconditional grants refers only to one municipality, although the size
of population for other municipalities varies as well. Normally, as a consequence of
changing numbers of inhabitants the total state population undergoes changes and the
total amount of unconditional grants does too. This is expressed in equation (27) where
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The effects are greatly influenced by the share of population change in the individual
municipalities. Again the derivatives found above play a role. According to the degree
of parallelism some of the derivatives show negative or positive values. Thus the degree
of parallelism is decisive for the distribution and absolute change of total unconditional
grants.
4.2.3. Effects of Changing Parallelism
The effects of varying the parallelism can be considered by introducing a variable α . It
shows the level of unconditional grants in the basic year, thus determining the degree of
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What happens to the unconditional grants if α  is increased? Differentiation with re-
spect to α  yields equation (29):34
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As the first order condition is positive, the unconditional grants grow if the parallel-
ism size is changed in favour of municipalities and decreases if the state takes a bigger
share of revenues by lowering α .
4.2.4. Model Considering Two Types of Municipalities
We express horizontal parallelism
39 by a constant bi not equal to one and a number of
inhabitants not normalised. The size of the different bi determines how the unconditional
grants are allocated to different types of municipalities. For the sake of simplicity we
consider two types of municipalities: (1) district-free town authorities (kreisfreie Städte)
such as large cities and counties, differ from (2) municipalities that belong to districts
(kreisangehörige Gemeinden).
The horizontal parallel development through vertical unconditioned grants between
the group of district-free towns (group 1) and the group of municipalities belonging to
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40
When the conditions (10) and (31) are satisfied and  2 1 b b is constant, then the term:
                                           
39  When considering the horizontal parallelism through vertical unconditioned grants, we can take into
account this principle in several ways. One is to keep bi at value 1, but to consider different categories
of municipalities within VEi. This is the usual way that the German states tackle this problem.
39
Through formula (3) a normalised GB, which is equal for all municipalities, is found, which depends
in its size on the weighting system and the kind of vertical parallelism. This approach comprises hori-
zontal parallelism, as mentioned. The relations of importance of municipalities among each other are
fixed through the artificial number of inhabitants. From  ) ( , , t i i i t i SK GB b VE AS SZ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =  follows (SZit  +
SKit)/ VEi = GB if bi and AS equal 1. As GB is the same for all municipalities, the relation of uncondi-
tional grants and tax capacity per normalised inhabitant is the same for all municipalities. Therefore
also the relation shown in equation (31) holds and becomes value 1.
40 
t SK , 1 shows the current (exogenous) tax capacity of municipalities belonging to districts at year
t .
t SZ , 1 expresses the current down-flow unconditional grants to the group of municipalities belonging
to districts, which is determined according to their administrative rank, 
t SK , 2 symbolises the current
(exogenous) tax capacity of district-free towns at year t, and
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expresses the relation of horizontal parallelism between the municipality groups 1 and
2. The additional condition
t t t SZ SZ SZ = + , 2 , 1      (33)
should also be satisfied for all periods, where  t SZ  means the total sum of inter-
governmental unconditional grants from the state to municipalities at t , as before. This
condition ensures that the vertical parallelism is considered together with the horizontal
parallelism.
Integrating equation (32) into equation (33) we can endogenously determine the size
of down-flow unconditional grants to the individual municipality groups (or in the case
of one municipality of type 1 and one of type 2) at t:
t t
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What happens to the unconditioned grants if  2 1 b b  is increased? Differentiation with
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) depicts the number of inhabi-
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The unconditional grants vary in favour of type of municipality that benefits from a
high consideration in parallelism through its factor b. If we analyse the effects of verti-
cal and horizontal parallelism on fiscal autonomy (the amount of unconditional grants),
all relevant equations are expanded by an expression bi /∑bj considering horizontal par-
allelism as well. The conclusions about changes vary in size but the direction of changes
remains same. The parallelism affects municipal fiscal autonomy differently.
5. Conclusions
For Germany, Switzerland Poland and the UK the relation of municipal expenditures to
GPD does not differ essentially although Germany and Switzerland have federal sys-
tem. Municipal investment is an important expenditure item in all four countries. Mu-
nicipalities of Poland and the UK rely more strongly on fiscal transfers.
The development of public finance during the last decade demonstrates that (1) cen-
tral government interventions with fiscal consequences have intensified, (2) territorial
and administrative reforms caused financial restructuring burdens, (3) tax reforms dis-
turbed municipal finance, (4) western European countries rapidly increased local ex-
penditures for social tasks, (5) municipalities tried budget consolidation, (6) financial
losses caused by EU regulations occurred, and (7) municipalities experienced a reduc-
tion in fiscal autonomy. In addition, transformation played a role in Poland and Ger-
many.
In order to ensure fiscal autonomy some serious attempts appear to be necessary to
protect local governments within intergovernmental fiscal relations in addition to the tax
reforms favouring municipalities. In this context the connection principle is examined
which aims at preventing municipalities from shifting tasks from higher to lower-level
governments without providing sufficient financial means. Although the fiscal compen-
sation can be made in terms of new taxes, fees, transfer of property, simplifying the
credit restrictions, etc., the most appropriate one seems to be conditional grants.
In all the investigated countries conditional current and investment grants are impor-
tant, as mentioned above. Therefore the fiscal autonomy of municipalities can be effec-
tively protected through the specification of conditional grants, although higher-level37
governments control the grant conditions. Goals of higher government levels are
achieved in a principal-agent situation where the higher government functions as the
principal and the municipal government as the agent. The usual principal-agent solu-
tions will be found as long as the higher government level can keep the municipality at
its minimum utility level (e.g. the minimum level of goal realisation). From a negotia-
tion model between a higher-level government and a municipality as players, a Nash
solution can also be found that demonstrates the size and conditions of the conditional
grants. Thus political recommendations are formulated to increase municipal power
with respect to conditional grants, when planning and co-operative decision-making.
The implementation of the principle of fiscal parallelism between higher-level gov-
ernments and municipalities with respect to unconditional grants appears to be another
option to safeguard local fiscal autonomy. Yet, it seems to be rather problematic to find
the optimal relation between the development of fiscal capacity of a state and that of the
municipalities. Further weaknesses concern the size, constancy and determination of the
parallelism relation in the case of unforeseen developments, etc. The effects of such
kind of parallelism on the fiscal autonomy of a municipality have not yet been discov-
ered. Therefore, a model of intergovernmental fiscal relation through unconditional
grants is extended under the consideration of parallelism. For example, it must be de-
termined whether local fiscal autonomy is enhanced if tax revenues vary under the con-
dition of a parallelism change. With a large size of parallelism and a considerably high
increase in state revenues, the amount of unconditional grants and fiscal autonomy in-
crease. In a similar context, various additional conditions are also elaborated for the
cases of changing population size, income and the parallelism relation itself. The kinds
and size of considering the parallelism depend on the interplay between population,
income tax revenue movements on the municipality and state level and on the size of
the parallelism. This is true for unconditional grants adopted for the vertical fiscal
equalisation as well as for the horizontal one through the vertically provided uncondi-
tional grants made under the consideration of priorities for some groups of municipali-
ties.
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Annex
Table a1
Yearly Classification of Municipal Revenues in Germany (Absolute in million € and Share)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
actual % actual % actual % actual % Actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Taxes and
similar reve-
nues 38709 34.0 43790 28.7 44577 27.6 44836 27.1 44078 26.4 44066 26.5 44805 27.6 48613 33.6 50970 34.9
Revenues from
enterprise and
fees 4718 4.1 6270 4.1 6644 4.1 6987 4.2 7036 4.2 7308 4.4 7445 4.6 7697 5.3 7899 5.4
Received in-
terests 1223 1.1 1576 1.0 1429 0.9 1216 0.7 1144 0.7 1052 0.6 998 0.6 1106 0.8 1041 0.7
Current grants 46587 40.9 65627 4.3 72347 4.5 75638 45.7 78458 47.0 77265 46.5 72677 44.7 71763 49.6 72830 49.9
Other current
receipts 27713 24.3 36158 23.7 39119 24.2 41167 24.9 42343 25.3 41201 24.8 40709 25.0 20380 14.1 20005 13.7
Less those
from other
towns 18633 16.4 22093 14.5 25513 15.8 27434 16.6 28645 17.1 28357 17.1 27196 16.7 26870 18.6 27464 18.8
Sale of real
estates 3267 2.9 4562 3.0 5459 3.4 6527 3.9 6402 3.8 6833 4.1 6743 4.1 6637 4.6 6391 4.4
Property trans-
fer 10276 9.0 16609 10.9 17174 10.6 15986 9.7 15850 9.5 15773 9.5 15177 9.3 13112 9.1 12599 8.6
Obtain. Capital
service 332 0.3 400 0.3 535 0.3 639 0.4 656 0.4 815 0.5 829 0.5 719 0.5 806 0.6
Participation
on sale 235 0.2 215 0.1 271 0.2 720 0.4 367 0.2 614 0.4 836 0.5 1724 1.2 1090 0.742
Net new debts 370 0.3 773 0.5 363 0.4 549 0.3 575 0.3 751 0.5 603 0.4 472 0.3 394 0.3
Less borrows
from munici-
palities 840 0.7 1114 0.7 1221 0.8 1182 0.7 1174 0.7 1151 0.7 1104 0.7 696 0.5 636 0.4
Total consoli-
dated receipts 113957 100.0 152772 100.0 161458 100.0 165649 100.0 167090 100.0 166171 100.0 162522 100.0 144657 100.0 145925 100.0
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2002a), p. 503 , and statistical yearbooks from 1991 on.43
Table a2
Yearly Classification of Municipal Expenditures of Germany (Absolute in million € and Share)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Organisation and
Management 12121 9.0 13016 8.5 13083 8.1 13039 8.0 13370 8.1 13365 8.2 13191 8.2 13420 8.3 13873 8.5
Security 4952 3.7 5792 3.8 6258 3.9 6358 3.9 6696 4.0 6757 4.1 6849 4.3 6980 4.3 7188 4.4
Schools 12349 9.2 12825 8.4 13167 8.2 13123 8.0 13528 8.1 13376 8.2 13307 8.3 13340 8.3 13343 8.1
Science and
Research 5117 3.8 5812 3.8 5859 3.6 5641 3.5 5733 3.5 5692 3.5 5668 3.5 5782 3.6 5945 3.6
Social Welfare 33043 24.6 38850 25.5 43396 27.0 46481 28.4 48337 29.1 46618 28.6 43285 27.1 42954 26.6 43230 26.4
Health, Sports.
Leisure 6220 4.6 8362 5.5 8195 5.1 8051 4.9 7876 4.7 7540 4.6 7309 4.6 7212 4.5 7253 4.4
Construction.
Housing and
Traffic 18976 14.1 20277 13.3 20081 12.5 19836 12.1 19405 11.7 18971 11.6 18619 11.6 18511 11.5 19240 11.7
Public Facilities.
Business Pro-
motion 16992 12.6 20100 13.2 19778 12.3 19341 11.8 19249 11.6 18423 11.3 17940 11.2 16846 10.4 16428 10.0
Municipal
Firms. Real
Estate Funds 8747 6.5 9852 6.5 9871 6.1 9685 5.9 9339 5.6 8646 5.3 8603 5.4 8568 5.3 8865 5.4
Finance 15942 11.9 17424 11.4 20914 13.0 21898 13.4 22506 13.6 23515 14.4 25181 15.7 27730 17.2 28408 17.3
Total 134457 100.0 152309 100.0 160603 100.0 163456 100.0 166038 100.0 162902 100.0 15995 100.0 16134 100.0 163774 100.0
All figures include special financial operations.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2002), p. 12.44
Table a3
Yearly Classification of Revenues of Swiss Municipalities (Share in %)
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Income and property taxes 49.0 46.6 46.7 45.8 45.7 45.7 46.0
Consumption taxes 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
Profits and concessions 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
Revenues from property 6.3 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.7 6.5 6.3
Fees 21.8 25.2 25.6 25.7 25.9 25.9 25.3
Development contributions
refunding
3.61 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9
Grant and unconditioned con-
tributions
13.6 13.2 13.0 14.2 14.4 14.4 14.9
Receipts for investments 5.5 4.8 4.6 4.7 4.1 4.1 4.1
Total (in million Sfr) 30115 37828 38506 39459 39232 40212 42055
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2002), p. 820.45
Table a4
Yearly Classification of Expenditures of Swiss Municipalities (Absolute in million Sfr and Share)
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Organisation and
management 2873 9.5 3351 8.8 3373 8.8 3282 8.5 3335 8.7 3395 8.6 3361 8.5
Justice. police. fire
protection 1360 4.5 1768 4.7 1799 4.7 1789 4.6 1792 4.7 1809 4.6 1783 4.5
Defence 560 1.9 429 1.1 380 1.0 353 0.9 302 0.8 281 0.7 260 0.7
Education 6673 22.1 8497 22.4 8769 22.8 8886 23.0 8924 23.2 9043 23.0 9028 22.7
Culture and leisure 1988 6.6 2072 5.5 2038 5.3 2045 5.3 1994 5.2 2094 5.3 2062 5.2
Health 4826 16.0 6772 17.9 6903 18.0 6923 17.9 6922 18.0 7035 17.9 7260 18.3
Social welfare 3365 11.1 4776 12.6 4989 13.0 5206 13.5 5346 13.9 5592 14.2 5878 14.8
Traffic 2642 8.7 2980 7.9 2945 7.7 2940 7.6 2873 7.5 2787 7.1 2921 7.4
Environment and
regional planning 2782 9.2 3345 8.8 3288 8.6 3406 8.8 3378 8.8 3529 9.0 3485 8.8
Economics 1022 3.4 907 2.4 837 2.2 800 2.1 621 1.6 700 1.8 707 1.8
Finance and taxation 2154 7.1 2976 7.9 3107 8.1 3066 7.9 2982 7.8 3062 7.8 2969 7.5
Total 30245 100.0 37873 100.0 38428 100.0 38696 100.0 38469 100.0 39327 100.0 39714 100.0
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (2002), p. 82746
Table A5
Yearly Classification of Local Authority Income In England*(Absolute in million GBP and Share)
1990/1 1991/2 1992/3 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9
actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual %
Revenues from local
taxes (a) 22530 37.6 20912 32.0 21756 31.4 20392 29.5 19844 27.7 21042 28.6 23102 30.6 23170 30.0 24759 30.4
Local fees and
charges (b) 12340 20.6 13514 20.7 13983 20.2 13191 19.1 13934 19.4 13611 18.5 14180 18.8 14923 19.3 16245 20.0
Non-tax




Tax Sharing (d) 21437 35.8 28868 44.1 32585 47.0 34575 50.0 37012 51.6 36919 50.2 35897 47.5 36712 47.6 37234 45.7
Bank credits &
municipal bonds (e) -507 -0.9 529 0.8 557 0.8 1160 1.7 155 0.2 1115 1.5 1570 2.1 931 1.2 931 1.1
less (f) -1703 -2.8 -2243 -3.1 -2644 -3.8 -4302 -6.2 -2529 -3.5 -2137 -2.9 -2337 -3.1 -2057 -2.7 -1875 -2.3
Total Amount of
Total Revenues 57468 100.0 65449 100.0 69351 100.0 69102 100.0 71707 100.0 73568 100.0 75596 100.0 77210 100.0 81431 100.0
*All figures in British Pounds (Millions). According to Table 2.1. Local Government Financial Statistics England 2000. These figures incorporate Total Revenue In-
come as well as Total Capital Income
a)  Includes council taxes, national non-domestic rates, council tax benefit grant and council tax transitional reduction scheme grant.
b) Includes fees, charges and other income from General Fund Account, rents and other income from Housing Revenue Account as well as fees. charges and other
income from the External Trading Services Revenue Accounts.
c)  Includes all external interest receipts as well as non-governmental grants, contributions and capital receipts from Capital Account. Note: Grants, contributions and
capital receipts from disposals of fixed assets, leasing disposals, repayments. etc. have a one-time only revenue character.
d) Includes revenue support grants to Local Authorities, Community charge grant, SSA reduction grant, specific and special government grants, government subsidies
and grants from Housing Revenue Account and grants used for debt redemption. Tax sharing also included.
e)  Includes external income, notional borrowing, increase in borrowing, commutation of specific loan charges, net change in capital creditors and accruals adjustment
to reflect the correct year. Note: Accruals adjustment for 1990/1 was negative, hence the negative value of Bank Credits and municipal bonds.
f)   Less indicates recharges to other accounts, receipts to local authorities, housing benefit transfers from other revenue account.
Source: UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2000).47
Table a6
Yearly Classification of Municipal Income in Poland (Absolute in million Zlotys and Share)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Revenues from local taxes (a) 25.3 24.7 20.6 21.3 15.3 15.0 14.9 15.8 16.2 18.5
Local fees and charges (b) 4.6 4.4 3.6 3.8 6.8 7.0 4.7 5.7 5.1 9.6
Non-tax revenues (c) n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.3 6.8 7.2 8.8 9.0 5.3
Intergovernmental transfers. spe-
cific grants and Revenues from Tax
Sharing (d) 70.1 70.9 75.8 74.9 71.6 71.2 73.3 69.7 69.7 66.6
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total amount of revenues in million
Zlotys* 6440 9649 14808 19993 30956 39518 46119 32354 34584 37287
*Note: Years 1990 to 1991 not included due to the lack of proper data.
a)  Includes Tax on real estate and agricultural tax
b)  Includes Transportation charges and treasury fees collected.
c)  Includes revenue form sale of property i.e. one time revenue character. 1992-1995: data on non-tax revenues not available.
d)  Includes shares in income taxes to State budget revenue, allocations and general subsidies from State budget revenue.
Source: Polish Official Statistics, Regional Data Bank, http://www.stat.gov.pl.48
Table a7
Yearly Classification of Total Local Authority  Expenditure in England (Absolute in million GBP and Share)*
1990/1 1991/2 1992/3 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9
actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % actual % Actual % actual % actual %
Housing 3037 7.2 2694 5.8 2413 4.8 2647 5.3 2387 4.6 2344 4.4 2109 3.8 2032 3.6 2321 4.9
Transport 1510 3.6 1672 3.6 1860 3.7 1986 4.0 2141 4.1 2023 3.8 1802 3.3 1745 3.1 1689 3.5
Education 18182 42.9 20379 43.9 21692 43.5 19507 39.2 19568 37.6 19449 36.3 19738 35.9 20022 35.7 10295 21.5
Personal Social
Services 4381 10.4 4782 10.3 5130 10.3 5836 11.7 6811 13.1 7522 14.0 8134 14.8 8602 15.4 9194 19.2
Fire Services 1008 2.4 1096 2.4 1174 2.4 1182 2.4 1267 2.4 1293 2.4 1330 2.4 1388 2.5 1450 3.0
Agriculture and
Fisheries 54 0.1 51 0.1 32 0.1 34 0.1 33 0.1 53 0.1 55 0.1 51 0.1 52 0.1
Sport. Recrea-
tion 1325 3.1 1308 2.8 690 1.4 681 1.4 706 1.4 730 1.4 740 1.4 731 1.3 779 1.6
Protective Serv-
ices (a) 5219 12.3 5772 12.4 6272 12.6 6281 12.6 6907 13.3 7110 13.3 7398 13.5 7634 13.6 7848 16.4
Urban and Re-
generation Pro-
grammes 440 1.0 540 1.2 693 1.4 761 1.5 653 1.3 564 1.1 725 1.3 649 1.2 628 1.3
Other Services
(b) 5.093 12.0 5429 11.7 6284 12.6 6348 12.8 6502 12.5 6821 12.7 6942 12.6 7314 13.1 7733 16.2
Social Housing
Grant 5089 4.9 2676 5.8 3585 7.2 4553 9.1 5121 9.8 5679 10.6 5963 10.9 5861 10.5 5848 12.2
Total 42338 100.0 46399 100.0 49825 100.0 49816 100.0 52096 100.0 53588 100.0 54936 100.0 56029 100.0 47837 100.0
*NOTE: Total expenditures include capital and operational expenditures.
a) Includes police, probation and aftercare, civil defence and magistrates' courts.
b) Includes environmental services, consumer protection, careers and sheltered employment and museums, galleries and libraries.
Source: UK Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2000).49
Table a8
Total Municipal Expenditures by Year in Poland (Absolute in million Zlotys and Share)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agriculture and Hunting 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.4 2.0 2.3
Transport and telecommunica-
tion services 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 6.2 6.5 12.2
Communal Economy 30.9 27.7 29.7 23.0 22.6 22.9 17.0 16.0 9.6
Dwelling Economy 8.1 6.9 5.3 4.3 4.7 4.8 4.5 3.9 3.2
Education 20.9 26.4 26.0 38.7 37.7 37.2 40.6 42.7 41.0
Culture. etc. 3.7 3.5 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.2
Healthcare** 6.3 6.3 6.3 1.4 1.2 1.1
Welfare
17.9 19.2 18.9
9.5 9.7 9.8 10.7 10.6 11.9
Sport. Physical Education 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.0
Public Administration 11.9 10.7 11.1 10.0 9.9 9.9 12.4 12.4 13.5
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Expenditures* 9583 14904 19828 31499 40504 47495 32835 36211 38568
Note:  Data starts with 1993 due to lack of complete data for 1990 - 1992.
* Total Expenditures include operating costs and investments.
** For the data sets in years 1993, 1994 and 1995 Healthcare and Welfare were classified together under the same category.
Source: Polish Official Statistics, Regional Data Bank, http://www.stat.gov.pl. 
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